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On a cloth untrue 
With a twisted cue 
And Elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
I.
POINTED PRESENTATION OR PRESENTATIONS FOR POINTS
Angola coverage both by the commercial media and by concerned non-official organisations 
and independent authors over 1975-1997 has/in large part tended to be selective, writer 
objective focused (sometimes to the point of tunnel vision) and on occasion related more to 
themes for which Angola was perceived (with greater or less accuracy) to be a stage than to 
Angola or Angolans as such. The results have hardly been particularly satisfactory in helping 
lay readers understand Angola nor in providing a data base (including understanding of 
dynamics) useful to those - Angolans and others - seeking to build a stable end to armed 
conflict and beginning of a process of reconciliation.1
Three - somewhat stereotyped - types of publication/presentation became dominant as a result.
The first was part of the global assault on apartheid South Africa. South Africa had 
intervened in Angola and the war in which it was a key player had been humanly and 
economically devastating for Angola and most Angolans. Further the tactics - especially 
broadcast mining of fields to deny rural presence and urban food supply outside UNITA 
controlled areas - of its ally (or proxy as it was usually presented in this category of 
communications) were open to severe human concern/human rights criticisms as was its 
pattern of governance. The result - however intended - was to give the impression UNITA 
had a minimal domestic base, was largely a creation of South African policy and needed to be 
broken by total military defeat. The facts that several mid 1970’s observers estimated it would 
have won 30% to 40% of the votes in a free and fair election and that its historical roots go 
back beyond 1500 and its current maximum leader and broad form to the beginning of the 
1960's were either set aside in silence or strenuously denied.
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The inverse of this demonisation of UNITA as de facto  an emanation of apartheid was 
frequently a rather acritical presentation of the Government of Angola and the ruling MPLA. 
The ambivalence of their commitment to giving priority to poor Angolan's livelihoods and - 
perhaps - even to fully universal access to basic public services2 were not explored. This 
canonisation of the MPLA - except among quasi official supporter groups and hard line 
Marxists or Usaphobes - was not pursued with equal vigour or detail to the demonisation of 
the UNITA-RSA-Apartheid triplet.
The inverse approach focused on Soviet aggression and the defence of Western Christian 
Democratic Civilisation by beleaguered South Africa and its gallant ally UNITA. However, 
again the canonisation tended (with the exception of a handful of Savimbi/UNITA acolytes3) 
to be much less detailed than, or even almost subsidiary to, the demonisation of the MPLA and 
of Cuba both set out as knowing instruments and accomplices, hired agents or pure catspaws 
of the Kremlin's drive for world conquest4 This approach included rather meretricious 
blaming of the breakdown of pre independence MPLA-MNLA-UNITA talks in mass violence 
(especially in greater Luanda) on the MPLA5 even more inaccurate creation of timetables 
placing Soviet and Cuban military intervention significantly before South African/CIA6 and 
quite incredible attempts to explain away Jonas Savimbi's rejection of the 1992 election 
outturn and return to an all too obviously preplanned war.7
In a sense these two stylised schools of presentations were Janus faces. In extreme cases the 
presentations seemed to be much more concerned about broader issues than about Angola or 
Angolans (even if the communicators' intention was in fact to reduce human deprivation, 
brutalisation and death in Angola as was frequently the case in the first cluster). Communism 
and Apartheid were the targets, Angola was a stage on which they acted and the details of the 
stage sets and the character development of the (Angolan) supporting casts were peripheral to 
the delineation of the leading anti heroes and their somewhat cardboard antagonists.
A third cluster of Angolan stories/analysis turn on the post Caetano Portuguese political 
process.8 The delineation of Portuguese last stage official and of MPLA-UNITA motivations 
and actions is at the least motivated by and at times seen through a prism of Portuguese 
political faction fighting and transition to a new polity/political process.
Clearly different Portuguese political, business, intellectual and intelligence factions were 
linked to one or more Angolan political actors. The actions of members of these fractions in 
Angola do illuminate or at least cast flashes of light on their aspirations and actions in Portugal 
and visa versa. Because the fall of the Nuevo Estado was rooted in its inability to win9he war 
to maintain the legacy of the sun never setting on the Portuguese state (a central nationalist 
justification for independence from Spain) late colonial, transitional and post colonial issues 
were much more central to the intellectual and political worlds of 1975-1990 Portugal than to
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1960’s France or Britain. That certainly produced a body of communications, but also 
problems in sorting out the accuracy and selection principles in work nominally focused on 
Angola but possibly actually intended to influence debate, dialogue or more direct action in 
Portugal.
Two more recent genres of writing on Angola can perhaps be short-handed as 'determined 
optimism' and 'a plague on all their hovels'. The raison d'etre of the optimistic cluster is by 
no means uniform: humanitarian concerns, diplomatic detente desires, hope for UN peace 
process reputation enhancement, business interests can all lead to accentuating the positive so 
strongly as to suppress the problematic and - more dangerously - to seek to grease squeaky 
wheels on the assumption this will fine tune peace (not loosen bolts as wheels fly off).
The 'plague' genre is also rather fragmented. Pure weariness and disgust of spirit over the 
brutal and murderous failure of what could (at least physically and economically) have been a 
sunrise state is present - understandably so. That stance does imply that, with the possible 
exception of humanitarian survival assistance, any involvement in Angola or with any Angolan 
actors will be stale, flat, unprofitable and risky. That Angolan10 (or at any rate perception of 
and personal response to Angola) based sub-genre merges into the more general theosophy of 
Afro-Pessimism. Intellectually it can perhaps be styled social Newtonianism or 
Deconstructionist Social Physics. It marries Newton's 2nd and 3rd laws of thermodynamics 
(on the generalisation, weakening of force and increasing randomness of energy) with the - 
whatever I want and can enforce is right - neo-Popian (the poet not the prelate!) principles of 
Deconstructionism. There is a strand which clearly is writing about the authors' visions of the 
present and future of European/North American inner cities, but exporting the blame to 
Africa, and another which perceives socio-political disintegration in Africa as the global future 
(and is more concerned about the future Northern aspects.11 These broader 'plague' variants 
have little to do specifically with Angola, or sometimes even Africa as a whole, but do at least 
implicitly propose" a small and far away place" or supping "with a very long spoon" as guides 
for 'dealing with' Angola/Angolan actors.
Clearly the foregoing genre sketches are at best reductionist in respect to the less flawed 
writing. Clearly too some bodies of communication - e.g. Angola Matters - do seek to 
achieve balanced, multi authored, multi dimensional (by discipline and by viewpoint) 
presentation.12 Nonetheless a disquieting proportion even of serious writing/communication 
has been relatively close to the genre sketches.13 Polemic discourse has value; supportive 
discourse always has elements of propaganda - the issue is partly of balance within particular 
pieces of work and partly among them.
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The reasons for concern are primarily twofold (and are pragmatic in the same way as Milton's 
opposition to externally imposed censorship):
a the Angolan case is all too typical of African conflict in respect to presentations and 
communications;
b the partialness of many communications is ultimately counterproductive in comprehending, 
mastering and reconstructing/reconciling out of conflict.
The point is not that independent communications on Angola have in general, been wilfully 
duplicitous nor that focused presentations on a handful of (believed to be) key themes treating 
other aspects as secondary or dispensable are necessarily operationally wrong or morally 
reprehensible.14 It is to argue that a broader range of perspectives and of vantage points both 
at any one time and over time is needed to avert principled polemics and articulated advocacy 
from deteriorating into shrill, dated and dangerously misleading parodies of themselves.
II
WHY? MALICE, MUDDLE AND/OR MOBILISATION?
To acquit the authors of the majority of the writing of mendacity or wilful suppression of 
evidence to mislead does not answer why the limitations and/or distortions cited arose.
Scarcity of accessible reliable, non-specialist friendly data on many facets of Angolans and 
Angola is a major contributing factor. There is a not insubstantial, albeit gap ridden and often 
non-objective body of writing on Angola but for non-specialist non-Lusophone persons 
(including almost all NGO and many non-Portuguese independent writers on aspects of 
Angola 1975-1997) it is neither easily accessible nor user friendly. At least until very recently 
this was compounded by an extreme government tendency to view almost all information as 
"Top Secret" because it might serve UNITA and/or South Africa.
Focus to achieve portability and to get the intended message across to achieve action toward 
the intended purpose posits brevity and avoidance not only of unrelated issues but also of 
general background and (except in volume length studies) even secondary aspects of the topic 




c. calamities (natural disasters)
d. ending conflict
e. halting mining/removing mines (i.e. as a source of unnatural personal catastrophes 
consequential on war).
The negative formulations are deliberate - Angola communications have a distinct tendency to 
convey the impression of being dominantly against something whose halting or at least 
attrition is seen as a prerequisite condition for more positive programmes of action usually 
semi-articulated late in the piece.15 Especially in their negative formulations, each appears to 
be a topic on which reasonable people should be able to agree as to the problem with the 
material presented focused first on demonstrating its existence16 and secondly sketching what 
is to be done. In that context two reasons for simplification (both as to narrowing coverage 
and as to stressing main 'atrocities of the enemy’ and not detailing 'minor errors of the friend') 
were compelling - avoiding distraction from the main theme and averting tedious argument 
over details which might sickly o'er or defer resolution until it lost the name of action.17
Perceptions vary with location in the same sense that a mountain looks different from 
varying angles and distances. With exceptions, being close to a person, an institution, a course 
leads to greater empathy and to at least partial acceptance of its/their outlooks and 
judgements. NGO's in both Angola and Mozambique have illustrated this reality - indeed in 
Mozambique many were plus FRELIMO que FRELIMO in opposition to providing 
humanitarian relief to civilians in Renamo controlled areas pardy because some would 
inevitably have been levied to feed troops (as the Government was perfectly aware) and 
because of the atrocities resulting from Renamo's use of terrorism as a strategic tool.
A special perception problem ca be summed up in the phrases "the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend" and "any part in a storm". Here outsider perceptions are usually more critical than 
those of decision takers. President Eduardo Mondlane commented "If I was sure I could 
control the use of funding I would take it from the Devil". Depending on the Devil in point 
(oddly enough the CIA18) many independent writers would demur. Similarly in 1974/5 from 
UNITA's perspective it had to find an accessible military provider/sponsor or perish. While it 
had reason to suppose it might win a 35%-40% plurality in a free and fair election it had only 
one external ally - China - and no effective access to it.19 The only possibilities open to it were 
the CIA and South Africa in respect to funds and equipment and South Africa in respect to 
operational personnel. That by its choice it would massively esculate and lengthen the 
oncoming civil war - largely made inevitable by FNLA - was quite possibly not foreseen and 
would not have carried much weight because in a purely Angolan armed conflict MPLA would 
inevitably have won.20
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Access has also been a limiting factor beyond the absolute scarcity of information and time to 
track it down. Access to data  (and going especially beyond the official record discourse and 
information) and to peer and sympathetic reader group credibility  do constrain objectivity and 
fullness of coverage. In respect to Angola to suggest publicily UN1TA had a long, genuine 
historic base or that some elements of the MPLA had distinctly authoritarian and exclusivist 
tendencies (even after the Nito Alves coup attempt and the marked change in the balance of 
power between the "new technocratic" and the "old creole" leadership fractions in MPLA) 
brought instant loss of access and credibility with the Government/MPLA and its external 
supporters and (most) NGOs even if some of the latter two groups were willing to consider 
the issues in private.21 This problem was particularly acute for writers who - even if writing in 
their personal capacity - were on the staff of or closely associated with organisations carrying 
out programmes in Angola.22
This problem is a general one. In most cases it is probable many authors overreact and 
practice too much self censorship. However, Angola - in the midst of a war which did 
threaten to topple the state (or as UNITA and South Africa saw it entrench a neo-totalitarian, 
exclusivist, aggressive elite certain to pursue it aims across the Namibian frontier) - was an 
extreme case. While there were certainly officials and leaders wishing to pursue a strategy of 
broader access to information than was initially approved and were willing to make data and 
comments on problems well beyond UNITA/RSA available though bending rules that access 
was clearly limited to persons perceived as sympathetic with fairly overt hostility to 
UNITA/RSA a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for being so perceived.
Critical analysis and programmatic proposals tend to have a staged life cycle and Angola - 
because of the protracted mixed civil war/war of external aggression has, at least until very 
recently, remained stuck in the first stage. In that phase securing attention and getting the 
country or topic on the agenda. Shouting a simple message with examples to support it is - or 
is perceived to be - key. Once the item is squarely on the agenda then it is possible - to use 
Mwalimu Nyerere's admonition - to "Argue don't shout" although the argument may be highly 
robust and the dialogue one, if not of the deaf, of persons of impaired hearing. Only later 
when at least broad parametric boundaries of fact and of plausible action are agreed is a 
reasoned dialogue (with more acceptance of problematicities in ones own analysis and 
proposals) fully practicable. Why Angola appears to have become caught in a time warp - at 
least until very recently - is less clear. It has never been a regular headline topic; its press 
appearances have been intermittent and usually crisis related; the end of the cold war took it to 
the bottom division of the global geo-political agenda as seen from the North from 1989 
through 1992 and the combination of a relatively weak international media performance by the
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Government and the South African connection/dragon's teeth mining of fields associated with 
UNITA have encouraged "a plague on both your houses" turning away. Thus, perhaps, the 
continuation of shouting.
It is clearly past time to move on to the second and third stages as rapidly as possible - most of 
all in the interests of Angolans. However, this may require not so much wider and deeper 
analysis with more attention to problematicities in each and every communication but a wider 
variety of communications plus an excision of past polemics which are no longer purposeful 
(not it should be stressed the excision of history which is already much too prevalent).
HI.
GAPS, ADDED STRANDS AND RELATIONSHIPS
Angola is a country whose care problem is comprehending, mastering and 
reconciling/rehabilitating out of armed conflict. The existing independent literature does focus 
on conflict but with overemphasis (at least in present and future terms) on external 
intervention and inadequate attention to the dynamics of domestic conflict and of its 
transformation to less fraught ways of managing and at least substantially resolving tensions.23
The data and analysis base gaps are numerous and, perhaps even more telling, is the tendency 
to static rather than dynamic analysis and of isolated rather than holistic presentations.24 To 
present them with full indication of - as opposed to guideposts to - then relevance to Angola is 
not practicable. Certainly it would be inconsistent with brevity but more basically it is 
impossible precisely because the gaps (especially as to causal and dynamic interactions) do 
ex ist
History - beyond the recent history of conflict and negotiations toward settlements - is the 
largest and most serious gap. This is particularly true in Angola.
a. prior to colonial rule three substantial states existed - the Northern Kingdom of the Kongo; 
a prazeiro25 state behind Luanda; a Highlands Kingdom on the Huambo Plateau;
b. these appear to have come into contact and conflict largely as a result of relations (dating 
to the end of the 15th Century) with Portugal and prior to their 19th (and early 20th) 
century conquest all had long been pre-colonial, new-colonial polities;
c. the core leadership of FNLA, MPLA and UNITA descends (sometimes very literally) from 
and their core support areas are those of the three former states.
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d. in the late 19th Century the old creole elites (Northern, Luanda, Plateau) were prominent 
and powerful including an acting governor general26 prior to their near suppression by the 
Republic which was much more interested in "jobs for the boys" of the rising bourgeoisie 
than the monarchy had been;27
e. during the colonial period de facto  forced migrant labour from the Plateau was used widely 
especially on coffee plantations and in diamond mining in the North leading to Plateau 
claims to the farms and mines as the product of their sweat and Northern hostility to the 
workers as Portuguese "carrier pigeons" invading their natural resource base.28
f. the Liberation War against Portugal was fought by a Northern, a Central and a Plateau 
party. On occasion (not just in the 1974-75 run up to independence) they fought each 
other and, indeed, UNITA had a somewhat tense non-aggression pact with the Portuguese 
ceding it certain areas in return for concentrating its military operations against the MPLA;
g. the late Portuguese/early independence era saw the explosive rise of a hydrocarbon enclave 
raising total real state revenue by a factor of more than ten;
h. the course of the 1975-1977 and 1980-1991 wars was marked by substantial dependence 
of Angolan actors (including FNLA before its comprehensive defeat with some leaders 
absorbed into the MPLA group in subsidiary roles) on external allies (Zaire/CIA; USSR- 
Cuba and RSA-CIA-Zaire respectively) a trend reinforced because the Angolan war was 
on one side a relatively hi tech one with a middle power (South Africa) deploying front line 
jets and artillery and the Government building up a personnel capacity and weapons park 
able to defeat them by the 1988-89 Battle of Kuito Cana vale.
i. the brutal bloody clashes in Luanda over 1974/75 and in Luanda and other towns when 
UNITA went back to war following the 1992 MPLA electoral victory, gave each side 
martyrs and grounds to distrust both the motivation of others and leaders' ability to control
followers.29
To attempt to comprehend or to master conflict in Angola without taking this history into 
account in a substantive and central way is likely to be a highroad to false breakthroughs, 
temporary respites, fudged 'solutions and repetitive reversions to armed conflict. The 
1974/75, 1988/92 and 1994/97 records of attempted tension and conflict management toward 
stable non-conflict fora and process creation does nothing to refute that contention. 
Unfortunately in Angola history is not repeating itself as farce but as ever deeper tragedies.
Economics - and in particular political economy and household economics - is also largely 
absent from or a peripheral tack on to, much of the writing.30 This is perhaps surprising since 
a substantial proportion is either at least partly Marxian or strongly influenced (even if in
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reaction against it) by Marxian thought. One might have expected more attention to economic 
infrastructures and dynamics and less to particular leaders or political superstructures, more to 
class (or subclass or economic interest group) tensions conducive to conflict and less to 
"tribalism" and "ethnicity" (often asserted without definition rather than argued or explained).
In Angola there are clear fault lines between urban and rural, elite and poor urban ("Cimento" 
vs. "Canisa") by economic subclass (e.g. small farming household or family sector, planter, 
rural enterprise labour, small trader, official - politician) and by Region. These partly overlap 
and partly reinforce historic political divisions and are in turn directly affected by economic 
strategy and policy (e.g. rural enterprise vs. small farming family priority in agricultural 
strategy, priority given to achieving universal access to basic services and infrastructure). To 
leave this out of tension/conflict/reconciliation analysis (or indeed out of past crisis measures 
to reduce vulnerability to calamities) bears some resemblance to playing Hamlet without its 
name character just as the neglect of history excises the usurping regicide Claudius, plus 
Hamlet's mother and murdered crowned father!
Macro economic skeleton sketches combined with reflections on early independence period 
Marxian choices, (Leninist New Economic Policy with joint ventures dominant in 
hydrocarbons, manufacturing and mining - at least in intent - in the case of Angola) failure to 
fit and exacerbation of tensions31 and of their mirror mirror image in rather reductionist 
adjustment - stabilisation - growth strategies, labelled Structural Adjustment but clearly failing 
to adjust basic economic structures, are becoming more common. So are socio-economic 
allocation (poverty, child deprivation, socio-economic strategy integration from macro 
through household level is yet to be attempted. However, these are rarely integrated into 
political and historical analysis or related in an analytical way with conflict.
Angola's conflict today relates in particular as well as specific ways to economics from the 
standpoint of who gets what, why, when and how? The impact of colonial use of migrant, 
de facto  forced, labour on building up cross claims to diamonds and coffee plantations has 
been cited. But the major factor is hydrocarbons. Angola's oil revenues are a glittering 
prize. By its nature hydrocarbon extraction and export is an enclave industry with direct 
benefits to a narrow group of workers and professionals and (under modern state-enterprise 
contracts) the central state.32 The revenue flow to the Angolan state is approaching $1,500 
million a year and could - with peace - easily double by the early 2000's. How it is used will 
largely determine who benefits not simply in the narrow sense of which politicians and officials 
but more basically in respect to basic services, infrastructure, small farmer livelihoods, urban, 
employment, safety nets - by region, by occupational group and by economic sub-class.
Certainly once peace is achieved the hydrocarbon (and diamond) revenues can loosen 
constraints on measures to reduce tensions and to create a dynamic toward dialogue and
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agreed allocation. But their scale and centralisation has created incentives to seek all out 
victory to control them which have not existed in cases in which peace with control of the 
central government cannot bring massive fiscal payoffs - e.g. Mozambique. It faces the 
inverse problem of. at best, minimally adequate resources to underpin reconciliation through 
enhancing basic service and infrastructure provision to regions which have historically 
perceived themselves as treated inequitably in allocation. Very limited margins to expand 
provision and barely adequate services anywhere create a blockage. Room for taking from 
supporting areas and cities to allocate to opposition regions and rural areas is distinctly 
constrained - as is the case in virtually any political process based on consent and multi-party 
elections. With large and growing hydrocarbon and diamond flows to the Treasury, an 
Angolan political management of tensions process would have many more degrees of freedom.
Ecological disciplinary based contributions to the study of conflict in SSA are - beyond 
passing asides and the lebensraum theme, formerly considered under will to conquest politics - 
relatively recent and not to date much centred on Angola. They often illustrate the shout 
phase, almost stereotypically with such grave distortions of reality and timing as to threaten 
their message being taken seriously.33
The problem is not whether declining resources - especially reasonable quality land - do lead 
to tensions and stresses: assuredly they do. The issue is when and how they contribute to 
conflict e.g. Rwanda and Burundi have been perceived as overpopulated for a century and 
from the 1920's were used as labour pools for North Kivu (with some - perhaps not major - 
linkage to the present Eastern Zaire rising). But conflict in the Interlake Zone dates back 500 
years and while land related to conflict throughout the link appears to have more alleviation of 
access, tenure system, conquest feudal and power elements than land scarcity per se. Similarly 
migration - in search of more or better land - can lead to conflict, even if initially peaceful as 
the 'new 'area fills up. But when and why? It has on balance rarely led to conflict in Tanzania 
but has on occasion (including very recently) in Kenya. In Southern Ghana "stranger farmer" 
entry onto land and ultimate relatively secure entry into the 'new' area local governance 
patterns (historic as well as modern), initially during British rule but continued since, has been 
relatively non conflictual while in the North the entry of the Kankamba has given rise to 
repeated conflict for over a century (including in the current decade).34
In the case of politics/governance, law and anthropology-sociology-psychology citing the 
disciplines as gaps would hardly be appropriate: but within each disciplinary cluster there are 
substantial sub-areas which are virtually empty. For example capacity to deliver services, law 
and order enabling ordinary people to go about ordinary daily life in peace and security, 
negotiating in a way which builds cumulative confidence that non-conflictual management of 
differences is possible have received little attention.
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Even in respect to political parties and political processes coverage has been somewhat 
limited and/or superficial. Particular leaders and ethnic (or regional) factors have been 
stressed but not the nature of parties and the tensions among fractions within them. The 
nature of FRELIMO and - to a point - MPLA as broad front anti colonial coalitions and its 
implications for their future (united or as multiple parties) has received limited.attention 
although MPLA's "old creole", "new creole" and "populist" fractions have been alluded to and 
the historic carnival tradition provides the same coded commentary on them as Caribbean and 
- to a degree - Brazilian carnivals on their system.35 FRELIMO has - partly because it and the 
Mozambican political process are more open - been analysed more. However, the implications 
of groupings of radical socialists, Northern fair sharists and hard-line capitalist roaders clearly 
not in full agreement with the Presidential-Governmental and (presumably) Party majority 
themes of free market social democracy with basic public service access, poverty alleviation 
(safety nets) and poverty reduction (private production/employment and public infrastructure) 
for possible party division, a new strategic synthesis or continued stresses do not appear to 
have been analysed in depth although they logically relate directly to the continuation or 
reversal of present policies.36
Political institutions also seem to be viewed more formalistically than holistically. Elections 
are a means to select-reject-recertify leaders, but can also be a symbol of non violent tension 
management.37 Admittedly the operative word is "can" - in Angola they were no such thing 
and the question needs examination of when an election is more likely to renew than to 
contribute to ending armed con flic t38
Parliaments need not govern to be significant both in general democratic and non conflictual 
conflict management terms. The Mozambique National Assembly does not govern, nor except 
at the margins amend legislation. The Government is Presidential and the checks on the 
President are calculations of voter acceptability and pressures of party leaders (including but 
not only FRELIMO MP's), enterprises and external governmental and NGO actors. But the 
National Assembly matters and matters more than simply being an open forum for dialogue 
and a sounding board for the opinions of various fractions of the public. It does study 
Government proposals, query them, delay them, seek - and marginally get - modifications.39 
Within that process it does provide a forum for and create a process of tension management by 
political means between FRELIMO and Renamo MP's. Indeed there has even been one 
resolution adopted initiated by a cross party group of MP's.40
The other major gap in political writing is on the aspect of governance which is second only to 
absence of naked oppression and state violence in public concern - access to basic services 
and infrastructure. Inequity (or at least inequality) in access (usually along regional,
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urban/rural or ethnic lines) as well as corruption and law service quality have frequently been 
cited but usually as peripheral or as outcomes of conflict. They may well be more integral.
In Somalia the collapse of basic service access (largely education, veterinary, water-health was 
always weak) from the late 1960's to virtual implosion by 1990 predates the collapse of the 
Barre regime. While it hardly explains more than a small fraction of the North-western 
resistance that chewed his army to pieces, it may be more crucial in the regimes' loss of even 
passive support/acquiescence almost everywhere. In Sierra Leone the implosion of service 
provision was even earlier - a moribund civil government with next to no delivery capacity 
beyond Freetown predated the rise of the RUF to the status of a serious threat to the state by 
up to a decade and a half.
Even when collapse of service delivery is clearly a consequence of armed conflict, it can feed 
back into eroding political legitimacy just as its renewed provision can have positive political 
legitimacy implications. RENAMO's (and to a lesser extent UNITA's) targeting of health, 
education, water and food supply networks - and their personnel - and the Mozambique (and 
to a lesser extent the Angola) government attempts to defend them and to enhance access to 
them in secure zones strongly suggest all perceived them as key tests of Party user friendliness 
and legitimacy in ordinary people's eyes.41 Whether such factors are highly significant in 
Angola is less clear than in Mozambique.42
The results of the importance of basic service access/delivery capacity are by no means entirely 
happy in the contexts of conflict and of immediate post conflict governance rehabilitation. The 
correlation of political importance to terrorist targeting is an evident example, but not the only 
one. Former armed parties are unwilling to envisage early surrender of local governance areas 
and of service delivery cadres not simply because they mistrust the new unified 'apolitical' 
government institutional structure but also because they see direct contact in provision of 
services (including law and order) as politically crucial. Negotiating reintegration has proven 
one of the more difficult aspects of reconciliation in Mozambique43 and has, to date, been 
virtually impossible in Angola.
The gaps in writing on law intersect with those in writing on political science/governance.
The first is in the area of law, order and human rights as a capacity or delivery problem
and the second on the symbolic aspects of the rule of law and of key legal constructs - e.g. 
constitutions.
Laws and the legal framework of institutions can aggravate tensions and/or hinder the 
resolution of conflict - by themselves they cannot end i t  However, the rule o f law - the 
concept and reality of a predictable, interpretable in advance, uniformly applied set of 
parameters bounding accepted conduct and placing sanctions on unacceptable - may have a
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more basic importance in conflict resolution and tension management than individual laws. In 
that regard the importance may be symbolic. Namibia's Constitution is clearly too rigid with 
too many procedural elements almost unamendable or indeed entrenched against the possibility 
of amendment. But the certainty of protection against manipulation (at least without an overt 
coup d'etat against the Constitution like President Fujimori's) and the process p f agreed 
adoption were of importance in securing a speedy, agreed transition to independence with 
substantial and broad confidence.44
To the ordinary person - as can usually be confirmed by open ended discourse with and 
listening in to them - law and order and human rights mean primarily freedom to go about 
ordinary day to day life (which does include speaking freely and organising with others) 
without fear of repetitive forceful intervention by things, insurgents, corrupt politicians- 
officials-courts-police or state repression and with some confidence that violations will be 
pursued by the police, the courts and the state with some degree of effect. Law and order 
systems which seek with some success to achieve this tend to be popular and vice versa.
While laws matter (and the rule of law even more) this is frequently a capacity problem of 
understaffed, underpaid, underequipped, underresourced law and order services. The 
contentions that law and order is never enough and can be abused are ones as well understood 
by ordinary Africans as by development analysts and human rights advocates - what ordinary 
Africans seem to grasp more readily than some analysts is that without law and order in the 
sense described there will be precious few effective human rights and precious little 
development.45
Sociology-Anthropology-Psychology are, at least in passing, present in much of the 
independent literature and central to some of it. However, they are not usually closely linked 
to other factors or to devising and sustaining processes of reconciliation and of conflict 
transcendence into non-violent tension management.46
One gap in sociology-anthropology is serious analysis of existing, emergent and potential civil 
society in Angola and other African states. One underlying problem is a tendency to impose a 
Northern (or a Northern NGO47) template and on that basis determine that African civil 
society is weak, fragmentary, nearly absent - or suddenly burgeoning with the emergence of a 
host of small, elite, quasi professional partnership groups which look rather like Northern 
NGO's.
That approach is radically ahistorical, acontextual and Northern metropolitan oriented to a 
degree widely, vehemently and accurately denounced as intellectual neo-colonialism in other 
fields of analysis and discourse.48 Historically Africa has had civil society groupings: age 
groups, locality unions, religious organisations. Few historic African states were monolithic 
let alone totalitarian - the Zulu Empire and the Abomey Kingdom are apparent exceptions. In
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present day Africa religious bodies (church and mosque from worship group to national level), 
trade unions, women's groups, some cooperatives, peasant unions, some village or urban 
neighbourhood bodies, youth groups and - much more occasionally - bodies relatively similar 
to Northern NGO's are the core of civil society. Because they do not "fit" they receive 
Northern concepts of NGO's and/or civil society they get relatively little analysis or support at 
least in conflict resolution and avoidance and 'demoeratisation' programming especially when 
significantly Northern influenced and financed.
That said civil society in Angola does appear to be less pervasive, influential and strong than in 
Mozambique49 or Namibia. Whether and why are questions which deserve priority 
investigation. The poor showing of "Third Parties" in the Angolan election - sometimes cited 
as evidence - is not particularly convincing. Except in former FNLA areas, no third actor 
looked likely to win and only MPLA and UNITA had arms so only they could stop or 
continue war. In Mozambique - where, unlike in Angola, FRELIMO's own political analysis 
and strategy made it relatively pro fair access for third parties - only one achieved 5% of the 
vote and that only marginally and possibly partly by misidentification.50
The psychology or psychology-sociology gap lies in analysis of how processes of trust 
building (suspension of disbelief) can be achieved to allow not simply elections but actual 
operation of institutions to manage tensions. To say that actual working together builds trust, 
as does the process of a contested election and seating of those elected, is valid. The problem 
is achieving the suspension of distrust to approach tensions and differences of opinion as 
manageable and to accept electoral defeat. Mozambique appears to have achieved this - why? 
how? with what remaining risks? Angola clearly has not done so and until it does any new 
"settlement" may prove as brittle and short lived as the 1989-92 one.
A problem related to gaps - whether seen as hidden gaps or as their mirror image of edifices of 
non-communication - is the use of terms which are at best bulging suitcases needing to be 
unpacked and at worst "symbolic truth" which is literally false or at least misleading. The two 
leading examples are Balkanisation and Tribalism/Ethnicity.
At one level Balkanisation is shorthand for the assertion that present conflicts are in part at 
least the result of the colonial era. That is usually valid. But at another level it is the assertion 
that larger states to combine peoples now in more than one state would have averted many 
conflicts. Angola is a case against that hypothesis. Arguably three states - Northern, Central, 
Southern - might have averted conflict though given the overriding importance of 
hydrocarbons and diamonds it is hard to see how that could have been achieved. In any event 
that would be a 'solution' through more, not less, Balkanisation. That point is relatively 
general - Africa's substantial wars have rarely been border conflicts related to pre-colonial 
state or cultural systems.51
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Ethnicity (for which Tribalism is usually a perjorative synonym reserved by 'civilised' writers 
for "lesser breeds without the law") has several meanings, (including regionalism). In any 
event it is not inherently a cause of conflict (as contrasted with tension or conflict of interest).
Ethnic groups with common cultures do tend to be interest groups. For example in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts for many years the key swing voting areas and council persons 
were "Portuguese" (encompassing Metropolitan Portuguese and Cape Verdians) who voted en 
bloc and used their swing role between the largely Irish/Italian 'machine' and the Harvard-MIT 
led 'reformers' to pursue measures they believed beneficial. That kind of ethnic 
identification/interest promotion is very general outside totally homogenous polities - e.g. 
Swaziland and Lesotho, albeit not Botswana. There is little evidence that it inevitably or even 
generally leads to conflict. Perceived inequity in access to services/infrastructure and/or 
political power certainly does lead to tensions and in extreme cases is a contributory factor to 
conflict. Sierra Leone is to a degree a potential case in point.
A related basis of interest promotion and tension and in pathological or unlucky, cases conflict 
is regionalism. Mozambique is a case in point. The South - for historic reasons, some 
predating conquest - is more culturally homogenous (though not totally so) and has been 
favoured (not least because of the - literally - extremely eccentric location of the capital. The 
North has been least favoured but the course of the liberation war created or North-South 
alliance which made tensions arising from peripherality none manageable by non-violent 
means. The Centre - which is by no means homogenous ethnically or in pre-colonial political 
history - has arguably been disfavoured and certainly so perceived itself (including its settlers 
community in the Portuguese rule period). The course of the liberation struggle aggravated 
these tensions. While it is unlikely that the result would have been sustained, armed civil 
conflict in the absence of external intervention, the regional (not inherently ethnic) tensions did 
provide tender for the intervenors and in the 1975-90 period of war came to have a conflict 
sustaining life of their own. Angola has some resemblances to Mozambique albeit it would be 
rash to argue that its tensions are so clearly primarily regional, not ethnic perse .52
The heritage of conquest - at least when ethnic divides are largely sustained by quasi feudal 
structures in which, even if usually not impossible individuals upward mobility is constrained 
by caste as much as or more than class rules - most certainly can lead to ethnic conflict 
Rwanda and Burundi are evident examples whereas Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and 
Liberia after Doe's breaking of the Americo Liberian resident colonial ascendancy do not 
appear to be. Even in these cases ethnic (caste) and elite (class) factors tend to interact. The 
1959 Rwanda revolution was arguably an anti feudal jacquerie as much as an anti Tutsi 
pogrom but the 1994 genocide was a centrally run ethno-political campaign.53
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To conflate self identified interest group, regional, feudal and class tensions under the rubric 
ethnicity - as is regularly done - seems unlikely to further conflict comprehension, reduction or 
transcendence.
This critique by identification of missing links and terrac incognitae is not intended to second 
guess the past:
a. the process of developing a body of independent writing on Angola itself illuminates 
weaknesses and non coverage not readily identifiable in any other way;
b. until recently Angola was arguably in the "shout" phase of the communication cycle;
c. the growth of a body of Angola oriented (Angolan and foreign) writers makes possible 
more coverage in more depth;
d. over time independent outcome oriented and more academic analysts have built up 
personal contacts and interchange of information and sometimes an interest in pursuing the 
outcome implication spin-offs of academic study and vice versa.
Rather the critique is a check list for informing future independent, analytical, outcome 
oriented work.54
IV. 
ANGOLA: CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD EXPLORATORY AGENDAS
To set out an agenda for independent writing on Angola even its outcome oriented fraction 
has limitations. For one person to do so is either inherently contradictory or arrogant - 
especially if the person is not an Angolan.
A key strength of independent analytical, programmatic and advocacy writing is diversity. 
Therefore no one person or discipline can even in principle set or carry out an optimal agenda. 
Breadth and interaction are of importance in agenda building as in analysis and prescription. 
Further agendas are not an area for majority voting - topics which look distinctly second order 
(or not policy applied at all) today may have become central in five years (and vice versa). 
Knowledge - especially outside the natural sciences - does not evolve linearly along a turnpike 
and the changing contexts in which analysis and prescription exist play as large a role in the 
rapidly changing fashions55 in conflict and development studies work as do the lure of novelty 
and depressive impact failure of past efforts on writers.
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W hat follows are a short list of items to go on an agenda not an entire agenda. They do relate 
to the gaps and weaknesses in prior work sketched in the previous section but are not the only 
topical themes which can be posited from them. In their present form they relate to the 
Angolan context - a list for Mozambique or South Africa or Namibia would be somewhat 
different.
1. Absolute poverty reduction - access to basic services, infrastructure, markets and 
livelihoods identifying state, civil society, enterprise roles, resources and requirements.
The tension management, regional (and rural/urban plus cimento/canisa) disparities 
threatening conflict, medium term economic diversity/sustainability56 and political 
processual implications require attention.
2. Civil governance capacity - basic services, infrastructure and law and order as discussed 
in the previous section. Resource (fiscal and personnel) balances plus roles of central and 
local government, Angolan civil society and external NGO's require forward articulation to 
identify the range and timing of practicable courses of action as well as their probable 
distributive and sustainability (political as much as narrowly economic) implications.
3. Accountability/transparency at all levels including who knows what now and what 
constraints on elites are in practice.57 A number of sub themes arise ranging from what 
accounts (numerical and verbal) are needed to allow holding politicians entrepreneurs or 
civil society office holders to account to what type of 'accounting' for war deeds are 
necessary/conducive to reconciliation.58
4. Prioritised Public Resource Forward Estimation and Allocation. This includes but 
goes beyond the second topic because the surplus generating sectors - in reconstruction, 
reconciliation and development as in war in the past - will for some years have high 
priority to raise future fiscal flows net of plough back and because absolute poverty 
reduction is not a total strategy - especially as its success reduces the proportion of 
basically poor households. Angola has degrees of freedom but optimal results are likely to 
require alternative allocation scenarios which do seek to balance sources and uses. The 
today's - or yesterday's - resource crisis coping of 1981-88 and especially 1993-97 is not a 
suitable - nor, with peace and a process toward reconciliation, a necessary - approach for 
1998-2007.
5. External debt write down to free up fiscal resources otherwise mortgaged to pay past 
(largely war or war destroyed project) debt would certainly facilitate economic, political 
and social reconstruction. Historically external borrowings to sustain war have virtually 
never been paid in full and it is not evident why Angola should be an exception. A detailed
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study of amounts, sources, terms,59 uses and probable lender attitudes to write down60 
which is accessible beyond State organs would facilitate both identifying ways forward and 
mobilising external support.
6. The nature, capacities, constraints on and dynamics of civil society bodies - individually 
and as a whole - as perceived by Angolans not along procrustean Northern models is a 
clear priority for analysis integrally involving analytical contributions from within them.
This sector is probably significantly more important to sustainable reconciliation, 
accountability creation and democratisation than efforts narrowly focused toward 
increasing the number of viable political parties.61
7. The contextual and processual ways in which greater suspension of disbelief, broadening 
agendas for concrete discourse resulting in managing tensions/allocations and resultant 
mutual confidence/reconciliation among leaders62 and supporters of the main two 
political parties/armed fractions in Angola might (as well as cannot) be achieved is crucial - 
especially as it is perfectly plausible that either the 1988/89 or 2002/03 elections, if free 
and fair, will result in a change in majority party.63 A comparative study with Mozambique 
(despite very real historic and contextual divergences) might be of special value, 
particularly if carried out primarily by independent Angolan and Mozambican analysts.
8. The meaning of security and the potential for Southern African regionalisation of 
security interact with several of the previous themes. Security can - probably usefully - be 
analysed from household (e.g. food security, freedom from bandits), through police type 
communal (e.g. transborder crimes whether banditry, drug running, tax evasion or fraud), 
to macro military political. That approach can be regional if the regional body covers all of 
the sectors (as SADCC including COSAS does), can - explicitly or implicitly agree on 
minimum standards of effective governance and has little or no reason to expect rogue 
action on the security front by any member. How immediately crucial these themes are for 
Angola is unclear - in this as in other respects its involvement in regionalism is less central 
than for most SADC Member States but likely to develop with peace and a less war 
focused set of economic and security priorities.
9. Possible and desirable interactions between Angolan and external actors - particularly 
Angolan State/Local Government/Civil Society and External Diplomats/Donors- 
lenders/NGO's - could usefully be explored with a view to identifying patterns and 
institutions of interaction which achieve relatively agreed divisions of labour and safeguard 
Angolan leadership - and development of analytical and operational capacity to support it. 
A comparative study would again be useful this time to avert the pattern of fragmentation
18
erosion of both State and Civil Society capacity (not always intentionally) by its supposed 
benefactors which is arguably the primary institutional structure problem confronting 
Mozambique today.64
And - as a sub theme within the previous one - enhancing Angolan contributions to 
independent analytical and prescriptive writing. The issue is not - or should not be - 
exclusion of foreigners nor even of foreign led projects. The action needed is literally 
affirmative - more Angolan participants and more Angolan leadership especially in agenda 






1 The author is arguably guilty to a degree of the limitations asserted in respect to the 
Angolan material in Children On The Front Line. The human and economic cost 
panorama set out was based on reasonably accurate data and reasoned estimates largely 
confirmed by subsequently available field data, as was the depiction of the Angolan polity 
as in large part a captive of external forces - South Africa's desire to make Southern Africa 
safe and profitable for apartheid and the proxy force backing manoeuvres of the USA, 
USSR and Cuba. However, a reader with little background was likely (though the text 
does not say this and - rather too subtly perhaps - implies otherwise) to receive the 
impression UNITA had no genuine domestic backing. Certainly the near 500 years of 
three way territorial conflict in present Angolan territory and their continuity and evolution 
under Portuguese rule are not even briefly spelled out. Why? First, space was limited and 
the authority of the text on its key areas - human and economic cost of war especially to 
children - required avoiding problematic or erroneous asides on broader issues. Second, 
the key purpose of saving children's lives was seen as necessitating a firm focus on the 
impact of war and particularly on South African involvement as the enemy and on both 
immediate emergency life saving and short to medium term life sustaining programmes. 
Third, COTFT, both as a report for UNICEF and as a tool for rescuing Southern African 
children from the impact of apartheid had to be, at the least, not unacceptable to all or 
almost all Southern African states other than South Africa or its impact would be 
destroyed by "friendly fire". As a result while no wilful misstatement or data manipulation 
took place in respect to Angola (and also to Malawi) some issues were sidelined or stated 
only by implication.
2 The second branch of this potential criticism is less valid - universal access to primary 
education and health care were priorities albeit arguably both were seriously urban biased 
and the latter too curative/hospital focused. The lack of any functional focus on livelihood 
generation for poor rural and favela households is indisputable, but it was the rule not the 
exception in SSA and was exacerbated during the 1980-1996 period by a survival 
allocation priority system which gave pride of place to the petroleum sector (to generate 
the funds for all other priorities); near co-equal priority to a military capable of facing 
RSA's armed forces (as well as UNlTA's guerrillas) on equal terms (a necessity for state 
survival); third substantial provision of income (in pay, perquisites and/or low cost access 
to resaleable goods) to personnel seen as crucial to carrying out other priorities (notably 
oil, armed forces, some senior politicians and officials and - somewhat randomly - selected 
groups of 'key' unit workers); fourth health - education - emergency relief (which were 
weak but functional in non-war areas until 1990 but collapsed during the 1992-94 renewed 
war) and fifth, all else (which received precious little after about 1983). The point is not 
the absence of a legitimate case for the government's priorities nor that arguably 
Mozambique with less resources did better in respect to basic services and emergency 
survival support, but that these issues were simply set aside with all weaknesses set to the 
apartheid account.
3 Ironically some who later lost faith in Savimbi i documented in chilling detail the 
internal authoritarianism and tactical brut it U NITA. Earlier these had not been
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(mirror image) unease characterises much of the coverage of then Prime Minister Leaboa 
Jonathan's government in Lesotho - a lion roaring against apartheid from the mountain top 
but also deeply anti democratic and prone to the use of thuggery (including by its 
uniformed forces) at home.
4 A somewhat bemusing (to readers outside the USA) sub group did treat Cuba as a "great 
power" and a global security danger to the USA. Somewhat contradictorily it also 
presented Cuba as purely a Soviet tool. The first contention was ludicrous while the 
second (in Angola as in Ethiopia) was problematic. Soviet and Cuban perceptions and 
own interests as well as roles and tactics did appear to diverge significantly even if 
secondarily.
5 On the face of the evidence none of the parties was blameless but MNLA was the initial 
instigator and UNITA the least prone to rapid resort to force (perhaps because the least 
well armed).
6 The best evidence on and analysis of timetables suggests that CIA political/strategic 
involvement and South African invasion clearly preceded the arrival of Cuban operational 
personnel or significant numbers of Cuban or USSR advisors and probably precipitated 
them. Like the previous note the topic is problematic; the criticism is that this body of 
communications treats it as non-problematic and adopts a purist position almost certainly 
quite unsustainable by the data available.
7 Both MPLA and UNITA agreed to the election (and battled over rules and areas 
controlled) on the genuine belief they would win. UNITA - unlike the Government - kept 
most of its best troops hidden (not demobilised or merged) in preparation for a fallback 
should it lose the election. The Government transfer of up to 20,000 ex-soldiers to 
paramilitary police was of a much lower order of magnitude and could hardly have been 
the base for a return to war. Because the return to war by UNITA - and the brutality of its 
onslaughts - totally eroded confidence (by anyone) and renewed memories of 1974-75 
urban violence large numbers of civilians were massacred - largely by MPLA 
supporters/police in urban and UNITA supporters/troops in rural areas.
8 The author is not well acquainted with this school of writing on, or in tangency with 
Angola and is, therefore, unclear how much is primarily concerned with presenting and 
promoting Angolan and how much with Portuguese political actors.
9 In fact only in Sao Jorge de Ouidah, Goa and Guinea Bissau was the war lost or being lost 
militarily. In Mozambique the tide was probably - but not absolutely certainly - turning, 
but in Angola the Portuguese military were on a roll. The collapse of the metropolitan 
centre from weakness on the periphery related to the human and economic cost of the war 
and perhaps to a military perception it could never actually be won as opposed to 
contained - not to military disaster.
10 It is quite possible to be deeply critical of almost all Angolan actors but to feel - whether 
on general humanitarian or regional/sub-regional commitments - determined to "go on 
trying" in presentation, contribution to dialogue and, perhaps, action.
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11 A somewhat uncharitable paraphrase of Churchill's dictum on Charles II that he reached 
the heights of tolerance via the easy paths of indifference would be that many Afro 
pessimists reach the depths of neo-fascist racism via the elegant intellectual paths of 
philosophical solipsism.
12 Multi authored studies do have the advantage of presenting different intellectual and 
outlook perspectives. This allows a serious reader with some background (and time to) 
draw his own conclusions. But is also means that readership will be narrow, quasi 
specialist not broad and -potentially - political action motivating.
13 The present author offers no apology for having been a leading co-author of Children On 
The Front Line nor of avoiding detailed historico political background (generally, not just 
in Angola) to achieve brevity, clarity and focus. But as his much more nuanced chapter in 
Angola Matters may suggest, he would not argue that COTFL alone is an adequate base 
for understanding or contributing to reconciliation/rehabilitation in Angola. Similarly he 
has systematically expressed grave reservations in respect to UNITA, and especially as to 
its maximum leader Jonas Savimbi, but sees no contradiction between that and examining 
the 500 year dynamic leading to UNITA's geographical and socio-political base nor to 
undertaking serious analysis of MPLA/Government strategy including problematic 
elements. MPLA's petroleum-military-support staff resource allocation strategy over 
1985-1996 clearly averted defeat - forced negotiation in a frame accepting the MPLA as 
majority party and may have achieved the initial base for termination of hostilities. But it is 
unlikely to be appropriate to reconciliation and trust building and would be quite 
inconsistent with achieving rapid advances toward universal access to basic services or 
improvement in rural and canisa household livelihoods which are - at least arguably - 
crucial to ensuring non renewal of conflict. To argue that is not to assert the strategy was 
wrong over 1985-95 (on balance the reverse) nor to endorse UNITA's priority allocation 
strategy which has in fact never been articulated.
14 The divide between simplification/avoidance of distraction and manipulative suppression is 
narrow but deep and also real for any one viewer but not necessarily in the same place for 
all. For example Mozambican refugees interviewed in the course of the Gersoney Report 
attributed over 90% of atrocities to Renamo and under 5% to governm ent (Voting 
patterns in 1994 suggest this cannot be attributed to uniform political loyalty - arguably 
over half voted for Renamo.) That probably does justify war period analysis describing 
Renamo's strategy as integrally involving terrorism and the Government's as not. In 
respect to mines in Angola the situation has been much more problematic. Basically the 
Government mined to protect and UNITA to deny access. Both strategies resulted in 
large numbers of civilian casualties (and the latter in exacerbated urban food scarcity) but 
only that of UNITA broadcast mines in fields. To cite only the dragons' teeth facet of 
mining is (however unintentionally) to mislead seriously - just as to assert it was 
Government policy as well is blatantly false.
15 Calamity relief is an exception. The stance that starvation is a bad thing has few critics and 
fairly terse presentation of overall conditions with a few key examples can lead directly to 
detailed strategic and tactical proposals for averting/limiting i t
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16 This contention holds even for the apartheid/communism cases. By the late 1970's 
apartheid had few defenders in principle outside South Africa - the issue was whether it 
was expansionist and deeply, directly constricting and snuffing out the lives of Angolans. 
While communism as a system and Russian neo-colonial regimes in Africa had a somewhat 
wider range of sympathiser by the late 1970's it was a shrinking and relatively small 
minority. What needed proving was that Russia had instigated aggression in Angola and 
that the MPLA was a dependent tool, a brainwashed lackey (suffering from "false 
consciousness"?) or brutal self serving apparatchnik "bird of a feather". In retrospect the 
first set of contentions would appear to have been correct - but to explain less of Angola's 
tragedy than their proponents believed - while the second are in substance as well as detail, 
at the most charitable reading, highly problematic.
17 This comment is not intended to be condescending. Any writer committed to a cause or to 
course of action does need to focus on the main themes and to stress the evidence 
favourable to his commitment. Where this becomes unobjective in the sense of falsification 
is never easy for a committed author - and very often not even for an informed relatively 
objective 'outsider' - to determine until long after the event.
18 President Mondlane's remark came in answer to a private query from a casual friend 
whether he had suspected the opaque North American Foundations' which at one point 
provided a substantial proportion of FRELIMO's total resources and several years 
subsequently turned out to be CIA conduits. In general many observers might well accept 
that he was correct - FRELIMO clearly was not captured by the CIA and Mondlane's 
integrity was rarely questioned outside ultra partisan polemics. But Jonas Savimbi could 
give the same reply in respect to UNITA's past dependence on South African and CIA 
funding, equipment supply, training and combat support. To what extent did it sell its 
principles (assuming they ever went beyond securing power at the centre as well as in its 
Plateau heartland)? To what extent are the distinct personal differences between President 
Mondlane and Savimbi relevant and why?
19 The uneasy non-aggression pact with the Salazaar regime allowing UNITA freedom of 
action in two peripheral provinces in return for concentrating military operations against 
MPLA was defunct with the fall of Cacetano and was itself the product of UNITA's severe 
military limitations.
20 That the most aggressive party - in terms of the Luanda canisa battles which made civil 
war inevitable - was in fact Holden Roberto's FNLA represented; a distinct miscalculation 
on its part.
21 Presumably criticisms of UNITA and particularly of Jonas Savimbi or suggestions that the 
MPLA was in no basic sense a Soviet puppet, whatever else it might be, were at least 
equally access destructive for anti-communist/UNITA supporter writers.
22 In a parallel example, the authors of Children On The Front Line were conscious that 
even publishing the infant mortality and malnutrition plus related data on Malawi (and 
noting they were less bad than those of war ravaged Angola and Mozambique but 
distinctly worse than those of any other SADCC state) without critical commentary was 
likely to make UNICEFs position in Malawi more difficult. While the Malawi Ministry of
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Health and UNICEF were co-producers of the data, its publication had previously been 
banned because the Life Present correctly saw UNICEF's commitment to the principles to 
be embodied in the Convention on the Rights of the Child as intensely political and 
radically different from his own priorities and the data as providing sticks and stones for 
his critics to use. Flow to deal with these forces toward self censorship is not an easy issue 
to resolve. Avoiding wilful falsehood is one principle, but even that is noCunambiguous in 
the case of selective omissions. Presenting objective data with a (sometimes deafening) 
lack of interpretation where possible can be seen as both principled and informative but is 
not necessarily accessible to all readers. Leaving areas in which publication would end 
access blank and hoping readers would note the gaps and draw conclusions - or at least 
questions - from them is a somewhat more tenuous self absolution (which the present 
author admits to having used especially when writing independently while actually working 
for a government).
23 Both the anti-apartheid and the anti-Communist genre's tended to assume a military 
victory, not a negotiated settlement. Even writing in a negotiated settlement context often 
appears to treat cease fires, demobilisations and elections as one off events which by 
themselves end conflict and create the conditions for civil management and resolution of 
tensions (divergences of interest).
24 These weaknesses in part characterise even more recent, more academic literature such as 
Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development, the conflict resolution study of 
Mozambique. More disciplines are brought in (though history and - in this case - law 
remain weak) and there is emphasis on dynamic and processual aspects but the disciplinary 
contributions do not always interact. That of economics is peculiarly non integrated 
perhaps because it concentrates on macro economics and strategy while the political 
science contributions pay little attention to the role of basic service (including law and 
order enabling persons to get on with daily life and livelihood) provision in achieving 
governmental legitimacy and managing/reducing areas of stress (or the reverse).
25 The Portuguese colonial prazeiro (crown estate) system ceded territories to persons to 
win, hold, rule, profit from for the Crown. In Angola it created a de facto  feudal state 
behind the direct rule Luanda enclave. Its rulers were largely creole, inter-married with 
historic African leaders and founded the great old creole families who were of central 
importance in late 19th Century Luanda and are the dominant core of M PLA/Govemment 
political and military leadership today (especially since the Nito Alves coup attempt).
26 As it happens a von Dunen, like the 1997 incumbent President and Prime Minister. Late 
19th Century Anglophone and Francophone West Africa had a parallel false dawn of 
African economic, professional and political advancement reversed after the turn of the 
century as did Mozambique. Because of their later colonisation the Congo, East Africa 
and German Africa lack this historical strand while settler rule denied it to Southern 
African other than Angola and Mozambique.
27 Presumably to the Crown the difference between nobles and commonality was so great as 
to render any commoner who spoke, read, worshipped, dressed, ate and fought 
Portuguese more or less similar creating avenues for advancement of colonial (Asian and 
Cape Verdian even more than Angolan and Mozambican) assimilados. The Republic with
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far more concern for advancing bourgeois livelihoods and the Nuevo Estado of Salazaar 
with its security concerns were far more prone to territorial and ethnic (in addition to 
cultural) racism.
28 The present peace settlement negotiation strand leaving UNITA in control of the diamond 
fields and Jonas Savimbi of a $35 million a year net cash flow from them would appear 
likely to exacerbate this tension and thus threaten renewed (North-Plateau) conflict.
29 Especially in the case of the 1992 urban killings by the MPLA supporters and the 
paramilitary police, it is by no means clear that strategy as opposed to genuine fury at 
being pitchforked back into war led to the thousands of murders of ordinary UNITA 
members, supporters, ex soldiers and suspected supporters. That, however, is irrelevant to 
the deep distrust it has created just as the particular responsibilities for and acts during the 
1974/75 Luanda canisa wars are not directly relevant to the continuing heritage of distrust 
and bitterness they have engendered.
30 Exceptions such as Children On the Front Line and Mozambique: Elections, 
Democracy and Development are significant but even they rarely integrate all strands of 
economic perspectives with each other or with the social and political analysis.
31 Angola - like Mozambique - appears to have followed Marx of the Herald Tribune in 
India, not Marx on Ireland, in socio-political economic outlook and strategy. In the 
former Marx perceived colonialism as breaking up unchanging, irrational pre-colonial 
systems and laying the base for capitalist modernisation i.e. as an historically necessary 
and, on balance, progressive force. On Ireland he wrote the first structuralist critique of 
neo colonialism clearly viewing British rule (including the snuffing out of the first Irish 
industrial revolution) as deterring capitalist development and anything but progressive.
The "new man" (socialist, humane, modern, rational, selfless) model was one therefore 
which was more Portuguese than the Portuguese in rooting out pre-colonial 'survivals'; 
stressed large scale enterprises (not only public sector ones) and regarded the 'peasantry' 
(family farming sector) as irremediably economically inefficient and potentially politically 
reactionary. The misfit with evolving African socio-economic patterns, with resource 
(especially professional personnel) availability and with average human balancing of 
idealism and self interest was massive and the belief very rapid, largely unexplained 
changes in daily life and relationship patterns would be wholly welcome was naive. While 
the philosophy was more deeply rooted and lasted longer in FRELIMO, it also influenced 
Angola substantially at least up to the relative loss of influence of the "New Creole" 
technocratic and ideological elite following the Alves coup attempt.
32 In a Federal State with an automatic revenue allocation formula - e.g. Nigeria - this can be 
a major conflict avoidance factor. Without those degrees of freedom it can lead to conflict 
- e.g. Papua New Guinea - unless the polity is relatively small in population, socio- 
politically relatively homogenous and possessed of a ruling leadership which uses the 
surpluses primarily to move toward universal basic service and safety net access and 
livelihood expansion - e.g. Botswana.
33 e.g. Worldwatch has causally linked genocide in Rwanda in 1994 with recorded harvest 
falls of 30% over 1989-93. This is - as put - arrant nonsense. Over a third of the country
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had come under insurgent control so no official crop estimates for it existed after 1979.
The problem of overcultivation (to the extent it is real not imminent) has been building up 
over several decades not arriving as a sudden calamity from 1990. The history of deeply 
conflicted wa Tutsi-wa Hutu relations among the lakes goes back to about 1,500 when 
lebensraum in the sense of conquest not environmentalism dominated it. Similar comments 
apply to their remarks on the Sudan which date the North/South conflict to the 1980's (not 
to at least a century earlier) and to the (predictable) failure of a northern apparatchnik 
capitalist land mining via mechanised sorghum extraction which had little impact on the 
South (and possibly little on actual domestic food availability) though it may (in respect to 
prior peasant and pastoral land user resentment) have increased Three City - W est and 
Islamic Brotherhood - Maadhist conflict within the North.
34 There are some clues. Absolute land pressure does not explain the divergencies - on 
balance it is greater in the Forest Zone than in the North. In the Southern Ghana Forest 
Zone cases the "incomers" spoke mutually intelligible languages and over time came to 
participate in local governance/community bodies (historic and modem) in addition to 
(eroding) active participation in original home community affairs. The Kankamba did not 
speak a mutually intelligible language, had no fall back home base in Ghana (Gold Coast) 
so no traditional political protectors and were excluded from/unwilling to enter amicably 
into existing historical local governance. The recent creation of three Kankamba skins 
(savannah analogue to stools or thrones) may allow tension management by parallelism in 
rural areas facilitating amicable mutual participation in modern urban level governance.
35 Ironically perhaps the one article focusing on the political counterpoint of the Luanda 
Carnival and the historic tradition of popular political commentary, criticism and ridicule of 
the elite it carries on which is known to the author is by an academic historian specialising 
in Portuguese and pre-colonial era history but at times applying its patterns and dynamics 
to more recent events.
36 Arguably in the 1994 election (and perhaps before) REN AMO was also a coalition of all 
groupings alienated, for whatever reason, from FRELIMO. Therefore analysis of the role 
(and future political allies) of its locally based, basic services oriented leaders and the more 
educated, civil operation oriented incomers in it deserve more attention than it has 
received. They can constitute a shift from an insurgency to a political party mode or a 
cleavage line with some potentially allies of President Chissano's radical social democratic 
fraction in FRELIMO should FRELIMO fragment.
37 The inclusion of Provincial Proportional Representation - at RENAMO's insistence - in 
Mozambique is an example of the symbolic role. It was seen to guarantee to all voters in 
each Province (at least of the main two parties) that they would have a voice because 
winners would not take all, substantial minorities would also be represented. Ironically, 
because FRELIMO's plurality of the National Assembly vote (only for the Presidency did it 
win a majority) included huge margins in areas of strength and "near misses" in a number 
of districts elsewhere whereas RENAMO had fewer landslide and more moderate margins 
by district, a "first past the post" constituency member system would not only have wiped 
out the third party but also given RENAMO a slim Assembly majority.
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38 The easy answer is that an election based on (necessarily false) assumptions by ail major 
actors that they will win is a prelude to renewed war. Zimbabwe contradicts the generality 
of that hypothesis even if it did hold for Angola and is pessimistically predicted to hold by 
most observers (Liberian as well as foreign) of Liberia.
39 How efficient this process is in modifying proposals and why certain provisions are queried 
intensively when apparently more contentious ones have been passed on the nod (e.g. in 
respect to local governance where the proposals seem in fact advantageous to REN AMO 
and the actual objections made by it trivial) are problematic, but the importance of 
RENAMO and FRELIMO deputies being - and being seen by their constituencies to be - 
able to differ, compromise, reach agreement non-conflictually is important. An even more 
symbolic Assembly is that of Rwanda. The bulk of its members represent the non­
genocide oriented parties of the former regime (a majority being appointed by their parties 
to replace victims of that genocide) and a small minority (5) the ruling RPF. Clearly it is a 
talk shop and a decree validating mechanism, not a normal legislature nor a real check on 
the RPF/RPA. But it has symbolic meaning: preserving a multi party state and at least the 
rudiments of a legislature with a built in waHutu majority. That is especially significant 
because no election is deemed helpful until it is viewed as certain that chauvinist (and, in 
particular, covert genocidist) parties could not achieve a significant share of the vote in a 
free and fair election - a condition most unlikely to be met until well into the next 
Millennium.
40 The cross party initiative was to make two Islamic holy days public holidays parallel to 
Christmas and Easter. The opposition was an odd Roman Catholic/Atheist-Agnostic 
amalgam. On official religious preference data - over a quarter Roman Catholic, one 
quarter each Protestant/Anglican and Historic African, almost a fifth Muslim and 4% 
Other/None one would have expected the government - which is broadly tolerant and pro 
religious bodies as civil society organisations - to agree. But it has not done so because 
the Roman Church opposes Islamic holyday recognition until Christmas and Easter are 
holidays under their own names - not, as now, Mother's Day and Family Day - and the 
supposedly large number of hard line non-theists among FRELIMO cadres oppose such a 
'blessing' because of the earlier history of FRELIMO - Catholic (and to a lesser extent 
Anglican/Protestant) mutual hostility. Unless there are a remarkable number of 
respondents describing atheism/agnosticism as "Indigenous" African Religions, the 
electoral balance gain would clearly be to promulgate four Holy Days under their own 
names as public holidays - an action consistent with present Government endorsement of 
religious group social service and safety net provision in cooperation with (and in principle 
part financed by) the State.
41 Voting outcome is, at the least, not inconsistent with that hypothesis. Province by 
Province FRELIMO fared better in cities and in Districts in which at least some services 
had been maintained or restored over 1992-94. Renamo's post 1990 creation of a more 
than symbolic primary school network and broadening of the coverage of its initially 
primarily military health services may have had parallel positive results for it in some 
Districts.
42 Experience elsewhere varies. The recreated Republic of Somaliland has focused half its 
budget on basic water, health, veterinary, education and civil police functions and appears
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to do so in response to the traditional representative institution - territory wide Council of 
Elders. Elsewhere in the former United Republic of Somalia, no such concern with civil 
governance (except in some cases civil police against banditry) is evident. However, quasi 
public/quasi civil society groups seeking to fill health, water, education gaps are usually 
encouraged and formally blessed albeit not funded.
43 Renamo has not allowed District personnel level reintegration except in Health. The 
exception may indicate the potential of confidence building in a potential win-win context. 
Health viewed RENAMO's 800 plus health service personnel as 95% plus requiring further 
and/or gap filling training. It offered to provide it over two years while providing interim 
government service (FRELIMO service as seen by RENAMO) or NGO cover. Once 
RENAMO came to believe Health meant what it said and would both deliver the training 
and return the personnel, the programme was welcomed presumably because of perceived 
benefits to RENAMO supporting areas. In the case of Education - a much less competent 
or innovative Ministry - no meeting of minds has proven possible so that two parallel 
(albeit geographically segregated) education systems remain in being.
44 The fact that South Africa under the NP was among the most manipulative of 
constitutional amenders in stripping out apparently entrenched positions ironically both 
raised white Namibian's demands for iron clad prevention clauses and SWAPO's 
willingness to accept them. W hat might happen were a need to amend an entrenched 
clause which was widely supported and did not infringe basic rights to arise in - say - 2038 
is an interesting intellectual question, but hardly one invalidating the case for very 
restrictive provisions to further confidence building over 1988-2008. Logically a three 
quarters majority in two successive Parliaments followed by a two thirds vote in a 
referendum should do as much as the present prohibitions (massive long term majorities do 
find ways to change laws) but psychologically and symbolically it would not have served 
the same purpose at the relevant time.
45 History is relevant to particular perceptions in specific contexts. Mozambicans are more 
prone to unqualified support for more, more effective police than Angolans because 
Mozambican police are basically civil (in both senses) whereas Angola has a substantial 
paramilitary police component whose 1992-93 record in particular was at best problematic 
even if it arguably did prevent UNITA overwhelming the Government when it first 
returned to war.
46 Indeed some communications appear to assume not only that ending conflict is either a one 
off act or a brief series of actions but that the 'norm' to which a post conflict polity and 
society revert is an absence of tensions (conflicts of interest) not a setting in which these 
can be managed.
47 Northern NGO’s are no more and no less part of African civil society than Northern 
Missionaries, well intentioned colonial administrators, aid agencies and well intentioned 
diplomats. Inherently they are accountable not to Africans but to home (Northern) 
members and financial supporters and to their own consciences. That can be consistent 
with cooperation with African civil society but not with being part of it. Nor is it 
reasonable to suppose that the broad financial, narrower intellectual/political and narrow
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policy formulation bases of Northern NGO's (all unpaid) nor their paid operational staff are 
generally replicable in poor African societies.
48 Part of the growing African reaction to external scholars and NGO's since 1990 does relate 
to this misplaced intellectual arrogance. The substitution of unaccountable foreign NGO 
(not probably accountable domestic civil society bodies) for partially or potentially 
accountable States in service provision at the insistence of Northern donors and lenders 
plays a larger part. However, that process is itself partly the result of a rather ill fitting 
concept of what accountability, democracy and civil governance are or can be in Angola or 
elsewhere in Africa.
49 For example Mozambican churches (acting in concert for the first time in their history) 
were influential in creating a pro-peace climate - not least in the Presidential Palacio de la 
Ponta Vermelho - and in facilitating communications around the negotiating process at all 
levels. Partisan they were not but political they were - and effectively so. There does not 
appear to be a comparable Angolan analogue.
50 This Party's line on the Assembly ballot paper was the last. On the Presidential ballot 
paper the last line was FRELIMO's. Some investigatory evidence suggests a not 
insignificant number of voters wrongly assumed that FRELIMO's was the last line on both
ballots.
51 The main exception was the Somalia-Ethiopia war. Present former United Republic of 
Somalia conflicts certainly are within the former states boundaries even if refugees, costs 
and sometimes violence spill across them. To contend that the Interlacustrine conflicts 
could be 'solved' by ethnic cleansing of all regional wa Tutsi to Burundi (or Rwanda) is a 
rerun of the idealistic homogenous nation state concept of President Woodrow Wilson, the 
League of Nations, and the Nansen Office which dislocated perhaps 25,000,000 people 
and killed perhaps 10,000,000 over 1919-1922 with no great reduction either in ravanchist 
boundary conflicts or even intra state, intergroup tensions. In any case the Belgians did 
not create the pattern of wa Hutu-wa Tutsi groupings. Tanzanian and Ugandan experience 
demonstrate that they are not inherently and inevitably conflictual. While the catalyst for 
the rising against the Mobutu regime did relate to its oppression of citizen wa Tutsi and its 
uses of murderous wa Hutu armed refugees, the Zaire insurgency has a much broader set 
of causes as its rapid support base expansion and geographic advance demonstrate.
52 Inequity not merely inequality which is perceived as historic, not perpetuated by present 
government policy and is. the object of measures intended to reduce it.
53 In 1959 local wa Hutu mobs often identified and did not harm "good Tutsi". In 1994 
organised, centrally controlled and scheduled mobs killed all available wa Tutsi and wa 
Hutu identified as politically willing to live/work together with them. Probably at least a 
third of the 600,000-800,000 genocide victims were "moderate" wa Hutu.
54 This section in large part draws on a project development safari for ACDESS (African 
Centre for Development Economic and Strategic Studies) with its Director Professor 
Adebayo Adedeji in February/March 1997 as well as previous UNICEF, SADCC and 
Government of Mozambique based work over 1986-1995.
29
55 Some of the apparent strategic changes are on second examination more repackagiing and 
reheadlining than major substantive shifts. As a local women's group leader remarked, the 
content of "child survival and development", "children in especially difficult circumstances" 
and "rights of the child" oriented programmes on the ground are - or can be - remarkably 
similar. Reheadlining may help mobilisation - especially if the initial headline failed to click
e.g. the re-emergence of "basic needs"/"basic human needs" as "absolute poverty 
reduction" a decade later. Some however are cyclical - and do relate to substance - 
"community development"/"development from below" of the 1950's did fall out of the hit 
parade and re-emerged under rubrics such as "conscientisation" (a curious conversion in 
"consciousness raising" retranslation from consciousness raising) in the 1970's and 
"participatory development" in the late 1980's and 1990's. Basic Needs/W ar Against 
Poverty of the 1970's represented a prioritisation of targeted floors, inclusion and tension 
management by reducing inequality through wider access which definitely fell out of 
favour in the neo-liberal high noon of the 1980's (as well as never gaining favour in 
Marxian growth and investment maximisation models). Absolute poverty reduction 
(sometimes unfortunately titled "alleviation" which logically means safety nets to reduce 
the pain of poverty not access to services, livelihoods, infrastructure and markets to 
emerge from it) represents a return to the 1970's prioritisation. Again it has conservative 
(tension reduction and/or production maximisation focused) and reformist/progressive 
(broadening participation and degrees of freedom, reducing inequality and - especially 
inequity, poor household earned income maximisation) strands.
56 Oil and diamonds can be good servants or bad masters. How their revenues and foreign 
exchange flows are used will determine whether a broader Angolan economy becomes 
competitive or an oil elite finances a political elite a degree of protection of weak sectors, 
an overvalued exchange rate defeating competitiveness and elite/popular divisions tending 
toward conflict.
57 Angolan decision takers do not have total freedom from accountability - not even Jonas 
Savimbi. But what accountability, to whom, when on what basis requires more analysis in 
processual as well as historic and static terms.
58 Straightforward trials are practicable only when one actor in the combat won 'total victory' 
- e.g. Ethiopia, Rwanda. Truth and Justice Commissions with more (e.g. South Africa) or 
less (e.g. Chile) potential punitive spinoff are possible in the context of negotiated conflict 
cessation. There is a genuine discourse on whether and when facing the past including 
unvarnished horrors of all (or almost all) main actors reconciles and heals and when it lays 
up resentments toward renewed conflict. Only South Africa in Southern Africa has taken 
this route and to date the balance of debate in Namibia and Mozambique has not favoured 
such Commissions.
59 For example at least some Russian (ex USSR) obligations provide for payment in dollars at 
the rate of about 0.67 per rouble per $ in goods at world prices or in roubles. When 
signed the third option was meaningless. Today with the rouble at about 4.000 to the $ it 
clearly provides the logical starting point for Angolan offers to pay since R8,000 million on 
that basis is $2,000,000 instead of $12,000,000,000! Whether it would be fair or prudent
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for Angola to pay $2 million "take it or leave it" is problematic; even to discuss paying 
$12,000 million is (from Angola's interests) nonsense.
60 War ravaged societies seriously seeking to reconstruct, reconcile, reduce poverty, 
rebuild/expand commercial exchanges usually can mobilise popular sympathy and business 
support in lender countries at least in respect of military imports and, perhaps, projects 
whose value was wiped out by war. In particular Western public and bank creditors and 
present/potential investors are highly likely to support a sharp writedown in payments to 
Russia as long as it is not characterised as a simple, naked default.
61 Civil society bodies which are in certain senses inherently political but usually not partisan 
political are likely to meet with much less resistance from MPLA and UNITA leaders 
seeking to maintain a duopoly on political office than FNLA or any fourth party. Further 
the context in Angola suggests most voters may very well not see further party options as 
very attractive while most Angolans might well wish to strengthen civil society bodies - 
especially those to which they adhere.
62 To reject the hypothesis that history is all about "Big Men" does not imply particular 
leaders and their characteristics do not matter. Savimbi's very clear, consistent, 
unswerving guest for national political power over 1958-1998 is both admirably principled 
to some core supporters and a real problem (even if he is now willing to participate in 
power not rule, or at least not before subsequent electoral success, which is itself 
problematic not clear) for almost all non-UNITA members.
63 The levels of expectations of what peace can bring and how fast, set against the cold 
realities of resources and timing, suggest a 5% to 10% swing away from the Government 
is likely - quite enough to elect UNITA and, if lags continued, turn them out again. While 
a MPLA-UNITA-MPLA electoral sequence once achieved might be valuable to processual 
consolidation of non conflictual resolution of tensions, it is by no means self evident a non 
conflictual, election mandated change of power in 1998/99 would happen.
64 For example in Mozambique external donors appear to provide health service finance - 
primarily to their NGO's - equal to double total (domestic and aid) Government Health 
Service spending to provide about a fifth as many services. A 10:1 unit cost ratio 
weakness ought to convince even (especially) ultra market advocates something is amiss. 
More sinisterly several major NGO's in the early 1990’s proposed to set up a hermetically 
segregated early warning data collection - analysis - exchange system excluding the 
Ministry of Health system as sources, analysts, recipients as well as the -admittedly limited 
- Mozambican civil society health service sub-sector. As one of the prime movers is 
syndico anarchist in ideology and does not endorse a leading role for governmental health 
service provision and the other views both the Mozambican Government and most main 
civil society actors (the existing Christian and Muslim ones) as - literally - damned, the 
internal logic of the proposal is clear. What is less so is why any Mozambican should be 
willing to tolerate it or any foreign government willing to finance NGO's proposing this 
type of - literal - subversion of both state and civil society. A less fraught in intent but 
almost equally problematic case is the umbrella Mozambican/External NGO Forum. It 
may soon have a Mozambican majority, but by definition a church congregation operating 
and financing a 75 person street children's home and school, several safety net schemes for
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poor households known to parishioners and a parallel middle school for pupils unable to 
gain state school places is not an NGO nor is the women's produce growing/selling coop 
which spearheaded Maputo Green Zone plot development and allocation to weave, 
provides various social as well as economic services to members and is a not uninfluential 
voice on women's needs, aspirations and priority to services. On the other hand a 
Mozambican professional cooperative whose members (say 10) are all paid (by external 
sources) to carry out projects for "the poor" can be a member (as several are). This 
seems, somehow, to be a disservice to Mozambican designed development of Mozambican 
civil society.
65 The Mozambique post conflict study cited earlier (and its Eritrean sibling) as well as the 
ACDESS Comprehending and Mastering Conflict project are examples of growing African 
participation in agenda articulation and implementation and in agenda initiation 
respectively.
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